How does cognition influence emotion?  (Page 13/13)

Which visual objects generate which cognitions? Or, which visual environments generate which types of cognitions? My guess would be there are visual environments that put a high cognitive demand on someone, or alerts them to a higher degree than less threatening or stimulating environments. It is interesting that vision plays such a large role in what a human or other animal might be thinking. For instance, a forest environment might make a human feel like it was under threat, or at least more so than a grassy environment where the human could see far around itself.

From the Fodor quote I concluded that it seems like the observations and conclusions reached from perception or vision are simple ones. Investigation into what is going on visually is just linking the vision of a scene (like a crime scene in the Holmes example) and with the knowledge you need to make the proper links. An understanding of of deep human emotional factors isn't necessary. However, a complex understanding of human motivation might be needed to understand complex ideas. Complex ideas might be linked to vision, however most things that people just see visually they don't need a complex emotional background to understand. There are many 'worlds' that each visual environment might represent. Those are also simple, however. In the visual field there are simple things like effects and causes (this causes that, etc). To understand the environment, much of the information of what is happening doesn't have to pass through consciousness since it is usually fairly simple. A deeper reflection, esp. a deeper emotional reflection is capable with complex thought, probably at a separate time from when one reaches the immediate conclusions they do about the environment.

Bibliography

• Atlan, H., I. Cohen, 1998, Immune information, self organization, and mean- ing, International Immunology, 10:711-717.
• Baars, B., 2005, Global workspace theory of consciousness: toward a cognitive neuroscience of human experience, Progress in Brain Research, 150:45-53.
• Baron-Cohen, S. (2002). The extreme male brain theory of autism. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2(2), 248-254.
• Baron-Cohen, S. (2008). Autism, hypersystemizing, and truth. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 61(1), 64-75.
• Crick Francis and Koch Christof (1994) – The Astonishing Hypothesis. New York: Scriber.
• Crespi, B. and Badcock, C. (2008). Psychosis and autism as diametrical disorders of the social brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31, 241-320
• De Luca, A Tony and Stephens, Newman L (2010) A New Theory of Consciousness: The Missing Link - Organization. (Unpublished) Retrieved from http://cogprints.org/7022/ 12/31/13
• Fields, Chris (2010) From “Oh, OK” to “Ah, yes” to “Aha!”: Hyper-systemizing and the rewards of insight. [Preprint] Retrieved from http://cogprints.org/7220/ 12/31/2013
• Fodor, Jerry A. (1990) "A Theory of Content". MIT Press.
• Frith, U. and Frith, C. (1999). Interacting minds – A biological perspective. Science 286, 1692-1695
• Frith, U. and Frith, C. (2003). Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B 358, 459-473.
• Gregory, R. 1970. The Intelligent Eye. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
• Gross, J. J. (1999). Emotion regulation: Past, present, future. Cognition and Emotion , 13(5), 551- 573.
• Harnad, Stevan (2011) Doing, Feeling, Meaning And Explaining. [Conference Paper] Retrieved from http://cogprints.org/7335/ 12/31/13
• Premack, D. G.; Woodruff, G. (1978). "Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?". Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (4): 515–526
• Van Der Velde, Christiaan D. (2004) The Mind: Its Nature and Origin. Prometheus Books. Amherst, NY.
• Vaknin, Sam. "The Manifold of Sense". Retrieved from http://samvak.tripod.com/sense.html 1/13/14
• Wallace, Dr. Rodrick (2011) Consciousness: A Simple Information Theory Global Workspace Model. [Preprint] Retrieved from http://cogprints.org/7288/ 12/31/13