The criterion used in the previous section - minimize the
average cost of an incorrect decision - may seem to be acontrived way of quantifying decisions. Well, often it is. For
example, the Bayesian decision rule depends explicitly on the
a priori probabilities; a rational method of
assigning values to these - either by experiment or through trueknowledge of the relative likelihood of each model - may be
unreasonable. In this section, we develop alternative decisionrules that try to answer such objections. One essential point
will emerge from these considerations:
the fundamental
nature of the decision rule does not change with choice ofoptimization criterion . Even criteria remote from
error measures can result in the likelihood ratio test (see
this problem ).
Such results do not occur often in signal processing andunderline the likelihood ratio test's significance.
Maximum probability of a correct decision
As only one model can describe any given set of data (the
models are mutually exclusive), the probability of beingcorrect
for distinguishing two models is given by
We wish to determine the optimum decision region
placement Expressing the probability correct in terms of thelikelihood functions
, the
a priori probabilities, and
the decision regions,
We want to maximize
by selecting the decision regions
and
. The probability correct is maximized by
associating each value of
with the largest term in the expression for
. Decision region
, for example, is defined by the collection of values
of
for which the first term is largest. As all of the
quantities involved are non-negative, the decision rulemaximizing the probability of a correct decision is
Given
, choose
for which the product
is largest.
Simple manipulations lead to the likelihood ratio test.
Note that if the Bayes' costs were chosen so that
and
, (
), we would have the same threshold as in the
previous section.
To evaluate the quality of the decision rule, we usually
compute the
probability of error
rather than the probability of being correct. This
quantity can be expressed in terms of the observations, thelikelihood ratio, and the sufficient statistic.
When the likelihood ratio is non-monotonic, the
first expression is most difficult to evaluate. Whenmonotonic, the middle expression proves the most difficult.
Furthermore, these expressions point out that the likelihoodratio and the sufficient statistic can be considered a
function of the observations
; hence, they are random variables and have
probability densities for each model. Another aspect of theresulting probability of error is that
no other
decision rule can yield a lower probability oferror . This statement is obvious as we minimized
the probability of error in deriving the likelihood ratiotest. The point is that these expressions represent a lower
bound on performance (as assessed by the probability oferror). This probability will be non-zero if the conditional
densities overlap over some range of values of
, such as occurred in the previous example. In this
region of overlap, the observed values are ambiguous: eithermodel is consistent with the observations. Our "optimum"
decision rule operates in such regions by selecting that modelwhich is most likely (has the highest probability) of
generating any particular value.