3.4 Value profile: integrity  (Page 7/7)

4. norfolk

• Norfolk belonged to the English aristocracy and his family had its own claim to the English throne. Yet, as Norfolk confessed to More, the aristocracy caved in to Henry on the matter of the marriage in order to protect its own position and secure its important position in the English familial hierarchy. Norfolk conceded that Henry was wrong but that this was irrelevant. Because Henry had the power to do what he wanted, it would be useless for the aristocracy to oppose him. They should wait for Henry to die and then assert themselves in the power struggle that would follow his death. If this resulted in civil war, then so be it. In the meantime, More should join the aristocracy and take the oath for fellowship if for nothing else.
• Questions : How does Norfolk’s position stand in regard to integrity? Consider the values of the English aristocracy: honor, tradition, courage, and fortitude. Did Norfolk remain true to these aristocratic values? Can these values be temporarily set aside in the face of the superior power of one particular aristocratic family, the Tudors?

Imagine a continuum between integrity, on the one end, and insincerity, corruption, and betrayal on the other. Now arrange these characters on this continuum. Who would you consider a saint of integrity? Who do you feel best falls on the opposite end of the scale? Can you invent any strategies for preserving personal integrity in the face of such a polarized political debate?

Works pertinent to integrity

From stanford encyclopedia of philosophy

1. Benjamin, M. (1990). Splitting the Difference: Compromise and Integrity in Ethics and in Politics . Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansis
2. Blasi, A. (2004). Moral functioning: Moral understanding and personality. In D. K. Lapsley and D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development, self, and identity (pp. 335–347). Mahwah, N. J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
3. Bolt, R. (1962). A Man For All Seasons . Vintage Press.
4. Bradley, F. H. (1927/1963). Essay 1: The vulgar notion of responsibility in connnexion with the theories of free-will and necessity. Ethical Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3–4.
5. Callahan, D. (1980). Goals for the teaching of ethics. In D. Callahan and S. Bok (Eds.), Ethics teaching in higher education (pp. 61–74). New York: Plenum.
6. Colby, A., and Damon, W. (1992). Some do care: Contemporary lives of moral commitment (pp. 294–311). New York: Free Press.
7. Crisp, R., and Slote, M. (Eds.). (1997). Virtue ethics: Oxford readings in philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
8. Davis, M. (1998). Thinking Like An Engineer: Studies in the Ethics of a Profession . Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press: 117-156.
9. Doris, J. (2002). Lack of character: Personality and moral behavior. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
10. Fingarette, H. (1969/1972). Self-deception (pp. 66–91). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
11. Flanagan, O. (1991). Varieties of moral personality: Ethics and psychological realism (p. 32). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
12. Frankfurt, Harry, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”, Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971)
13. Frey, W., and O’Neill, E. (2008). Engineering ethics in Puerto Rico: Issues and narratives. Science and Engineering Ethics, 14(3), 422–425.
14. Gentile, M. (2010). Giving Voice to Values: How to speak your mind when you know what's right . New York: MacGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.
15. Harmon, G. "The Nonexistence of Character Traits," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 1999-2000 100, pp. 223-2 26. Found at http://www.princeton.edu/~harman/Papers/Older-Published.html. Accessed July 27, 2013
16. Harris, C. E. (2008). The good engineer: Giving virtue its due in engineering ethics. Science and Engineering Ethics, 14(2), 153–164.
17. Huff, C., Barnard, L., and Frey, W. (2008a). Good computing: A pedagogically focused model of virtue in the practice of computing (part 1). Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society, 6(3), 246–278.
18. Huff, C., Barnard, L., and Frey, W. (2008b). Good computing: A pedagogically focused model of virtue in the practice of computing (part 2). Journal of Information Communication and Ethics in Society, 6(4), 286–316.
19. Huff, C., and Frey, W. (2005). Moral pedagogy and practical ethics. Science and Engineering Ethics, 11(3),389–408.
20. Huff, C., and Rogerson, S. (2005). Craft and reform in moral exemplars in computing. Paper presented at ETHICOMP2005 in Linkoping, September.
21. Hursthouse, R. (2006). Virtue ethics. In Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Stanford, CA: Metaphysics Research Lab Center for the Study of Languages and Information, Stanford University, 1.
22. Hursthouse, R. (2007). Environmental virtue ethics. In P. J. Walker and R. L. Ivanhoe (Eds.), Working virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
23. Jackall, R. (1988). Moral mazes: The world of corporate managers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pedagogical Implications of Moral Psychology 627
24. Janis, I. (1982). Group think: Psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
25. Kupperman, J.k. (1995). Character (p. 41). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
26. Lapsley, D. K. (1996). Moral psychology. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
27. Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority. New York: Harper and Row.
28. Oliner, S. P., and Oliner, P. M. (1988). The altruistic personality. New York: Free Press.
29. Pritchard, M. (1996). Reasonable children: Moral education and moral learning. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
30. Pritchard, M. (1998). Professional responsibility: Focusing on the exemplary. Science and Engineering Ethics, 4(2), 215–234.
31. Rest, J. R., Narvaez, D., Bebeau, M. J., and Thoma, S. J. (1999). Postconventional moral thinking: A Neo-Kohlbergian approach. Hillside, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Press.
32. Solomon, R. C. (2003). Victims of circumstances? A defense of virtue ethics in business. Business Ethics Quarterly, 13, 43–62.
33. Williams, B. (1976). Persons, Character, and Morality. The Identities of Persons , ed. Amelie Okesenberg Rorty. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press: 197-216.