0.8 The golden age: 1957-67  (Page 6/10)

In view of the continuity of PSAC’s membership and the fact that Wiesner had been a member of the Cambridge academic circle encouraging Kennedy’s presidential ambitions, it is not surprising that the presidential advisory system continued to function effectively. The organization and agenda of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, established by Act of Congress in September 1961, was largely set by Eisenhower administration PSAC reviews. Glenn T. Seaborg, a Nobel Laureate chemist from the University of California, Berkeley, and an Eisenhower-era PSAC member, was appointed chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in February 1961. He and Wiesner, with strong PSAC support, played essential roles in the events leading to the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban treaty.

President Kennedy’s confidence in PSAC is evidenced by its tremendous productivity. The committee was a virtual report machine. Two early assignments resulted in reports entitled Research and Development in the New Development Assistance Program (May 24, 1961) and the Report of the Ad-Hoc Panel on Environmental Health (June 6, 1961). PSAC also maintained interest in science education and manpower ( Meeting Manpower Needs in Science and Technology , December 12, 1962) and the special requirements of specific academic disciplines ( Strengthening the Behavioral Sciences , April 20, 1962). PSAC also took on policy issues impinging on the direct interests of powerful non-defense federal departments with its reports on Science and Agriculture (January 29, 1962), and Science and Technology in the Department of State (February 27, 1962). Those two reports are evidence of a decided shift in operating philosophy, mirroring the style of Kennedy, who wanted his staff to be far more openly involved in the affairs of cabinet departments and agencies than did Eisenhower. Wells, op. cit . Whereas both of Eisenhower’s special assistants (Killian and Kistiakowsky) viewed their mandate strictly in terms of offering advice to the president and his senior advisers on issues with which he was directly and immediately concerned, Wiesner sought to oversee and to some extent coordinate the activities of the entire federal science and technology system. He assumed several functions (among many others) that the BoB had long been trying to force on a reluctant National Science Board.

In September 1962, at the strong recommendation of Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA), Wiesner’s staff was reorganized as the Office of Science and Technology (OST) and transferred from the White House to the Executive Office of the President (EoP), partly on the grounds that that move would institutionalize the presidential advisory system and partly on the grounds that the staff had become too large to fit easily into the White House organization itself. The establishment of the OST within the EoP made the science advisor accountable not only to the president but also to congress, since the director of OST required Senate confirmation and the activities and budgets of all EoP units were subject to congressional oversight; one reason for establishing OST was to quell congressional resentment about its denial of access to the presidential science advisory system. Ibid., 204 Wiesner’s access to the president was further reduced after the appointment of McGeorge Bundy as Director of the National Security Council. Although relations between the president and his science advisor remained cordial, his national security advice and participation was sought less frequently—a circumstance that also restricted his ability to bring other science- and technology-related issues to the president’s attention.