0.7 The early cold war: 1950-57  (Page 3/7)

Regarding the latter question, the general consensus appeared to be that NSF should avoid defense research entirely. Golden believed that that view was shared by at least three prominent board members he interviewed: James B. Conant, President of Harvard and Chairman of the NSB; Lee DuBridge, President of the California Institute of Technology; and Detlev Bronk, President of both the Johns Hopkins University and the National Academy of Science. It was also shared by Alan Waterman, the Scientific Director of the Office of Naval Research, who in March 1951 was to be nominated by the president as the first NSF Director. However, the full board did not share that consensus, and DuBridge, Bronk, and Waterman also appear to have had second thoughts, primarily because Golden’s proposed solution to the larger question of scientific mobilization threatened to preempt the effectiveness of the foundation and the NSB.

As to the question of a more effective institutional arrangement to mobilize science for defense, the recommendation of the Stewart committee to reconstitute OSRD as an operational organization at the White House level was rejected by virtually all of Golden’s interlocutors (including Stewart himself). “Their attitude,” Golden wrote following an October 25 meeting with Stewart, DuBridge, and James Killian of MIT, “is that when the crisis comes, the organization will spring up virtually automatically around the science leaders who will come to the fore spontaneously.” Ibid., 14. The problem, then, was how to smooth the way for that promised “spontaneity.”

To that end, in a December 18 memorandum to the president, Golden urged “the prompt appointment of an outstanding scientific leader as Scientific Adviser to the President.” The functions envisioned for this official would be: Ibid., 65-67.

a) To inform himself and keep informed of all scientific research and development programs of military significance within the several independent Government departments so engaged.

b) To plan for and stand ready promptly to initiate a civilian Scientific Research Agency, roughly comparable to the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) of World War II.

c) To be available to give the President independent and comprehensive advice on scientific matters, inside and outside the Government, particularly those of military significance.

The memorandum concluded by urging, “Plans for such an OSRD-type ‘Scientific Research Agency’ should be developed promptly and the agency itself should be established in a modest way as soon as the first appropriate projects selected, evolving thereafter in accordance with opportunity and the then prevailing degree of urgency.”

The newly appointed NSB’s short-lived but vocal opposition to the presidential science advisory concept created momentary consternation at BoB, where it had been assumed that scientific leadership solidly backed the idea. Indeed, as already noted, three of the most prominent board members—Conant, Bronk, and DuBridge—had been instrumental in helping shape the concept. Moreover, DuBridge and Bronk were among the candidates being mentioned for the post.