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This report is the work of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy’s Drug Policy Program, led by William Martin, Ph.D., the institute’s Harry and Hazel Chavanne Senior Fellow in Religion and Public Policy. In addition to the sources listed in this paper, along with many other published books and articles, this report has benefited greatly from continuing dialogue with Professor José Luis Garcia Aguilar at the University of Monterrey, and with retired DEA intelligence chief Gary J. Hale, now head of the Grupo Savant think tank, and from interviews, mostly on condition of anonymity, with present and former agents of the DEA, the National Drug Intelligence Center, the FBI, and the Border Patrol. These are referred to in the paper as “observers” or “sources.” The program has recordings of all of these interviews.

Because at least the major cartels have developed into full-scale criminal organizations, the Mexican government has little choice but to attempt to check their power and the damage they cause. Aggressive action by the Calderón government, advisable or not, has obviously exacerbated the violence. Insofar as possible, actions against criminals should be waged by the police rather than the army, perhaps focusing on one major cartel at a time or concentrating efforts on a single city—with Ciudad Juárez the obvious choice—to develop and implement a strategy that could be replicated in other places. Perhaps attack one cartel at a time. For elaboration of this idea, see Bonner, “The New Cocaine Cowboys,” 43f. President Calderón’s use of the army and navy is understandable, given their numbers, advanced weaponry, and reputation as less corrupted institutions, but the costs of that decision are high and becoming clearer. The Mexican government should work to shift from a mindset of war to one of crime fighting and to reduce the role of the military, while strengthening that of the police. Obviously, that process will be gradual and dependent on the success of the following recommendations.

Given the role of corruption in the production and trafficking of drugs, Mexico must continue to build and reinforce professional civil service, law enforcement, and judicial systems, from local to federal levels, with effective measures to prevent, identify, check, prosecute, and punish corruption and violation of the rights of citizens. This will involve improvement in pay, higher educational requirements, vigilant screening, and continuing reinforcement of appropriate values and attitudes. Obviously, this is a mammoth and daunting task. The United States can offer assistance, technical and financial, but most of this work will have to be done by Mexicans.

Both countries must work to improve educational and employment opportunities, so that young people in particular do not turn to drugs and crime because they have abandoned hope of achieving a meaningful life by legal means. In connection with a March 2010 visit to Mexico City by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, accompanied by Secretary Napolitano, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen, and DEA Acting Administrator Michele Leonhart, the United States and Mexico announced that their joint ongoing efforts would focus less on military measures and more on precisely these two lines of action. Hillary Clinton’s 2010 visit, see Ken Ellingwood, “U.S. pledges more help in Mexico drug war,” Los Angeles Times , March 23, 2010.

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Source:  OpenStax, Cartels, corruption, carnage, and cooperation. OpenStax CNX. May 23, 2011 Download for free at http://cnx.org/content/col11293/1.2
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