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Before the Society actually took action, an article appeared in the New York Times that described the Society's plans. The article quoted an internal memo­randum from Bell that was to be distributed to the Society's staff that explained the reasons for the restructuring and the cutbacks. The memo stated: "We have a looming budget gap that threatens the integrity and very survival of the institu­tion. We must act today to put our house in financial order—or there will be no house and no tomorrow worthy of our shared legacy, commitment and aspirations.”

McGill (1988d).
The article also quoted Frank Streeter, a member of the Society's board of trustees since 1964, who admitted that the Society's "reach [had] exceeded its grasp."

In other articles following the Society's announcement, the Society's trustees expressed regret, and some measure of responsibility, for the institution's predica­ment. Streeter was again quoted, this time saying, "We went along with the deficit because we felt this was the way the Society had gone for 150-odd years. Things had always worked out, but this time they didn't. You could say perhaps we were foolish."

McGill (1988h).

The Society's restructuring plan was controversial, especially the decision to deaccession the European pictures. In an article that appeared the day the layoffs actually took effect, several staff members, all of whom refused to be identified, objected strongly to the fact that the Society planned to sell collections "without first having mounted a public fund-raising campaign."

McGill (1988c).
Needless to say, there was a great deal of discontent on the staff, and apparently someone broke the veil of secrecy that had surrounded the Tolles report since 1986, making it available to the Times. In a front-page article that appeared in the Sunday edition, the abominable conditions that had existed at the Paterson warehouse were reported pub­licly for the first time. Although the works had been transferred to a Manhattan warehouse nearly two years before, there had been no money available to restore them. The deteriorated condition of approximately one hundred paintings and more than three thousand works of early American decorative art was described in graphic detail. Christopher Forbes, a Society trustee, commented on the Soci­ety's predicament, saying, "It's tragic that the situation was allowed to deteriorate to the point that it was. The nadir has been reached."
McGill (1988f).

But the nadir had not been reached. It was soon discovered that some of the damaged paintings were not even owned by the Society but were on perma­nent loan from the New York Public Library. This fact escalated the controversy beyond the internal troubles of a single institution and made it a city and state cul­tural crisis. Robert Abrams, the New York State attorney general, launched an investigation of the Society to "look into the questions raised by The New York Times, whether the art collection is being properly cared for and what legal consequences that may have." In addition, the attorney general planned to investigate "whether the financial affairs of the Society are being properly handled by the board of trustees."

McGill (1988g).
Obviously, none of this boded well for the Society's plans to deaccession the European pictures—such sales would require approval from the attorney general before they could take place.

In a July 14 letter to the Society's membership, Bell attempted to contain the damage. He wrote that the Society's $11.5 million endowment was "patently inadequate" to meet its needs. Further, Bell noted that other historical societies with less complete collections, smaller facilities, and narrower missions had larger endowments. He did not, however, take responsibility for the diminished endow­ment; in fact, he blamed the October 1987 crash for erosion of the Society's cap­ital base: "Although the October stock market crash diminished our endowment and hurt our efforts to increase gifts and contributions, we will vigorously pursue additional sources of revenue through various fund raising campaigns and activ­ities. We cannot—and will not—pursue a real estate solution involving the con­struction of a condominium tower such as was rejected by the city in 1984."

But it was too little too late. The Society was fully embroiled in public con­troversy. Museum directors around the country voiced their objections to the Society's deaccessioning plans. A highly critical article headed "Museum's Down­fall: Raiding Endowment to Pay for Growth," appeared in the New York Times

McGill (1988h).
followed by an equally scathing article titled "Plundering the Past" in New York magazine.
Larson (1988).
It also came to light that the Society's deficit for the fiscal year 1987-1988 was approximately $3.5 million. And on July 26, an editorial appeared in the New York Times criticizing Society management and questioning the Society's plan to sell art works to pay for operations.

The next day, James Bell resigned his position as director of the Society, and the associate director, Joel Sollender, was dismissed. It was agreed that the trustees should hire an interim director to oversee day-to-day operations until a proper search for a permanent replacement could be conducted. The trustees also adopted a series of resolutions in response to the public criticism. First, on the rec­ommendation of Helene Kaplan, who had recently been retained as the Society's principal legal adviser, they decided to postpone indefinitely sales of any works from the collection and appointed a special trustee committee "to review the advisability of revising the Society's collection management policy with respect to the use of proceeds from deaccessioning." The special committee was to solicit the opinions not only of Society staff but also of others in the museum world. The board also authorized a group of the Society's officers (Albert Key, Frank Streeter, Wendell Garrett, James Griffin, and Norman Pearlstine) "to form a committee of persons unaffiliated with the Society and knowledgeable in financial, curatorial, operational, and administrative matters to advise the board on a strategic, finan­cial, and curatorial plan for the Society."

With the July 27 board meeting, James Bell's tenure was over. It was soon learned that Bell and Sollender had received substantial overtime pay during their tenure. That news erased from everyone's memory any favorable impressions re­sulting from programmatic progress that had been made by the Society through its collections conservation efforts, its educational programming, and its exhibits. As had been the case during the crises of the 1820s and the 1920s, the Society was enmeshed in a public controversy that threatened its very existence. Would it sur­vive? Who would be its savior? These were the questions before the board as Bell departed.

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Source:  OpenStax, The new-york historical society: lessons from one nonprofit's long struggle for survival. OpenStax CNX. Mar 28, 2008 Download for free at http://cnx.org/content/col10518/1.1
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