0.6 The end of the west  (Page 15/19)

In its “development path to a peaceful ascendancy, China may outflank Huntington and accommodate Kissinger. In a recent article, Zheng Beijian stressed that, despite its rapid growth, China would become a modern, medium-level developed country only in 2050. Its challenges were a shortage of resources, environmental problems, the need to coordinate its economic and social development goals and balance reform with stability. He referred to a strategy of three ‘transcendences’: Replacing the old model of industrialization with new technology, economic efficiency, low per capita resource consumption and pollution, and efficient use of human resources; emerging as a non-threatening great power by rising above ideological differences in a search for peace, development and cooperation; and replacing outdated modes of social control in a harmonious socialist society in which self-governance would supplement state administration and democratic institutions and the rule of law would be strengthened in “a stable society based on a spiritual civilization.”

The greater challenges in East Asia relate to tensions between China, Japan, Russia and the Koreas in the context of China’s growth and rising resource needs, and nationalist tensions in South-East Asia. Japan will have to adjust to the presence of an economic peer, unconstrained by constitutional restrictions on its military spending, with whom it will compete for hydrocarbon and other resources, and trade. It will have to decide how best to coexist with two (and possibly three) regional nuclear powers. No multilateral treaties presently underpin Asian security; there are only bilateral arrangements between Washington and Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. This is inadequate: Treaties committing Asian states to reciprocal security founded on an acceptance of limits are needed for stability. Japan's weakened economic growth has reduced its strategic significance. South Korea’s rapid advancement has led to assertive independence in regional policy. Taiwan has been politically marginalized and integrated into the Chinese economy: Although one cannot exclude a miscalculation, a peaceful accommodation with Beijing is likely. North Korea’s fractious propensity for disruption can best be contained through a united stance by its regional seniors. The US has already reduced its role as the unique balancing power in East Asia. Fukuyama has suggested that Washington, using the six-party talks on North Korea, should encourage the creation of a permanent five-power organization to address regional security issues. This could be linked to ASEAN (and the ASEAN Regional Forum on Security Matters); the ASEAN-plus 3 group, which includes China, Japan and South Korea; and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), which includes the USA.

Russia, particularly in its efforts to leverage its oil and gas production and reserves to restore its global standing, poses another challenge. Dimitri Trenin has written that Moscow has “left the Western orbit”, seeking to claim “its rightful place in the world alongside the United States and China rather than settling for the company of Brazil and India.” Despite Gorbachev’s notion of a “common European home” two decades ago, the idea that Russia would be “integrated into Western institutions…was stillborn from the beginning.” Russia would only join the West if it had “co-chairmanship of the Western club – or at the very least membership in its Politburo.” Despite its inclusion in the G8, this has not happened. Putin succeeded neither in developing a special relationship with Washington after 9/11, nor in sustaining a French-German-Russian axis after Iraq. In the past year it arranged military exercises with China and with India, ended gas subsidies for its neighbors and cut off Ukraine, disrupting European supplies, after demanding a four-fold price increase. Its Middle East policy has diverged from that of the West: It invited Hamas leaders to Moscow and offered them financial support. It rejected sanctions against Iran and has continued its nuclear cooperation and arms trade with Tehran. It is also expanding into its ‘near abroad’ for economic and political reasons.