<< Chapter < Page Chapter >> Page >

Instead, with its reserves mostly depleted and struggling to balance revenues and expenditures, the Society's board of trustees took a step to increase the in­come that could be spent from its endowment: it adopted a "total return" invest­ment policy. Prior to this action, the Society spent only the dividend and interest income generated by its endowment. It did not spend any portion of realized gains generated through capital appreciation of the portfolio. Such a policy encouraged the Society to forgo growth investments (such as small company stocks) for in­vestments that generated the most current return (such as bonds).

The new total return policy allowed the Society to spend up to 5 percent of the endowment's market value annually (based on a three-year moving average of the endowment), irrespective of whether the endowment actually generated that amount of dividends and interest. In the annual report for 1967, Adams, referring to the remarkable growth in the market value of the endowment, ex­plained it this way: "This [1967 investment] performance would not have been possible if the funds had been entirely invested in bonds to secure maximum re­turn. Yet the portion of our money invested in 'growth' stocks produces initially a very low rate of income because of the retention of earnings by rapidly expanding companies. With rising costs of operation, the Society needs to increase income, yet prudent investment for the future in an inflationary economy dictates the pur­chase of substantial percentages of securities whose present yield is low." Adopt­ing a total return philosophy allowed the Society to pursue a goal of maximizing the growth of its endowment without sacrificing current income.

For a detailed explanation of total return and other principles of endowment management, see Chapter Ten.

The impact of the new strategy on the Society's operating budget was sub­stantial. In 1967, for example, proceeds from transferred realized gains (to bring spending up to the 5 percent limit) amounted to $244,204, increasing investment income by 48 percent over the 1966 investment income total of $509,000. This in­crease is represented by the discontinuity, or jump, in the Society's total revenues as depicted in Figure 4.1. It should be pointed out, however, that the newly avail­able realized gains relieved the pressure on Society leadership both to develop new revenue sources and to limit the growth of expenditures. Between 1966 and 1970, total operating expenses increased at a rate of 9.5 percent per year, while revenues were flat, increasing at an average rate of literally 0 percent per year.

See Table C.4-1 in Appendix C.
The growth in expenditures coupled with the lack of growth in revenue created a financial vise that would begin to close on the Society as the 1970s neared.

Nevertheless, the tremendous jump in revenue put Society leadership in an expansive mood. A major building renovation had been completed, the galleries were reinstalled and redecorated, and in the library, the lighting was redesigned and a new carpet was installed. With the renovations complete and the increase in spendable investment income, the Society's focus shifted toward becoming a more popular institution, increasing the emphasis given to the museum, educa­tion, and special programs.

Get Jobilize Job Search Mobile App in your pocket Now!

Get it on Google Play Download on the App Store Now




Source:  OpenStax, The new-york historical society: lessons from one nonprofit's long struggle for survival. OpenStax CNX. Mar 28, 2008 Download for free at http://cnx.org/content/col10518/1.1
Google Play and the Google Play logo are trademarks of Google Inc.

Notification Switch

Would you like to follow the 'The new-york historical society: lessons from one nonprofit's long struggle for survival' conversation and receive update notifications?

Ask