0.3 Peck, c., & Mullen, c. a. (april 2010). “feet to the fire”:  (Page 5/8)

Some urban district leaders have also moved and removed principals from their schools, actions which focus public attention on “bottom line” educational accountability. Resulting news media reports regarding principal turnover rates may, in effect, help signify a district leader’s formidable, results-oriented approach. A profile in a Charlotte business journal, for instance, reported that Charlotte–Mecklenburg Schools Superintendent Gorman had replaced approximately one-quarter of the district’s principals (Clary, 2009). In a Baltimore Sun profile of Baltimore Chief Executive Officer Andrès Alonzo, a reporter noted that one-third of the district’s principals had been replaced within the first 18 months this superintendent held office (Neufeld, 2009). According to an Atlantic magazine report, in District of Columbia Chancellor Rhee’s first year in the position concluded, in 2008, with 24 principal changes, including the Chancellor’s non-renewal of the principal’s contract at the school her own children attended (Risen, 2008). In 2009, The Washington Post reported, “since [Rhee became] Chancellor in 2007, roughly half of the principals’ posts in DCPS have changed hands” (Turque, 2009, p.1). In the end, such news reports about the principal turnover rates under new, reform-focused district leaders likely sent the urgent message “perform or else” to principals, district employees, and the public.

Interviews with the media have also helped frame the relationships of district leaders with the principals under their direction. After completing her first year as Philadelphia’s Superintendent of Schools, Arlene Ackerman explained to the Philadelphia Inquirer that none of the district’s principals was removed for poor student academic performance prior to her tenure. In contrast, reportedly Sperintendent Ackerman had “sent letters to about 30 principals warning them that unless they improve[d] dramatically, they could be disciplined and removed from their assignments next year” (Graham, 2009, p. 1). Ackerman emphasized, “Are there people uncomfortable? Absolutely. At every level. I don’t play games. What you see is what you get” (p. 2). This public statement may have signified Ackerman’s willingness to take whatever steps she believed necessary for ensuring improved academic outcomes from schools and students.

As in other cities, New York City school system leaders instituted principal accountability systems in conjunction with its district reform efforts and accessed the media in order to broadcast the changes. A notable development was the 2007 implementation of individual school report cards that provided a single letter grade, “A–F,” for each school. When 50 of the district’s schools received “F’s” and 99 received “D’s” on the first distribution of grades, Mayor Bloomberg announced at a news conference that many of the poorly performing schools would face principal removals or would even be shut down. The New York Times reported that the Mayor remarked, “Is this a wake-up call for the people who work there? You betcha” (Gootman&Medina, 2007, p. 1). In this particular instance, the Mayor was able to publicly direct accountability pressure from his office toward the schoolhouse door.