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State | Per se BAC Level | Zero Tolerance BAC Level | Enhanced Penalty BAC Level | State | Per se BAC Level | Zero Tolerance BAC Level | Enhanced Penalty BAC Level |
Alabama | 0.08 | 0.02 | N/A | Montana | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.18 |
Alaska | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.16 | Nebraska | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.15 |
Arizona | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.15 | Nevada | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.18 |
Arkansas | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.15 | New Hampshire | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.16 |
California | 0.08 | 0.01 | 0.15 | New Jersey | 0.08 | 0.01 | N/A |
Colorado | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.20 | New Mexico | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.16 |
Connecticut | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.16 | New York | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.18 |
Delaware | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.15 | North Carolina | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.16 |
DC | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.20 | North Dakota | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.18 |
Florida | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.15 | Ohio | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.17 |
Georgia | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.15 | Oklahoma | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.15 |
Hawaii | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.15 | Oregon | 0.08 | 0.00 | N/A |
Idaho | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.20 | Pennsylvania | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.16 |
Illinois | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.16 | Rhode Island | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.15 |
Indiana | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.15 | South Carolina | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.15 |
Iowa | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.15 | South Dakota | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.17 |
Kansas | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.15 | Tennessee | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.20 |
Kentucky | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.18 | Texas | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.15 |
Louisiana | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.15 | Utah | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.16 |
Maine | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.15 | Vermont | 0.08 | 0.02 | N/A |
Maryland | 0.08 | 0.02 | N/A | Virginia | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.15 |
Massachusetts | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.20 | Washington | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.15 |
Michigan | 0.08 | 0.02 | N/A | West Virginia | 0.08 | 0.02 | N/A |
Minnesota | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.20 | Wisconsin | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.17 |
Mississippi | 0.08 | 0.02 | N/A | Wyoming | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.15 |
Missouri | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.15 |
The theoretical justifications for the per se BAC level rule is (1) that it will provide a disincentive for individuals to drive after drinking and (2) that it will reduce the cost of prosecuting DUI drivers. In terms of economics the law aims to reduce the negative externalities created by drunk drivers. The question to be examined in this paper is whether the per se laws have reduce the number of automobile fatalities. Persumably, if the law is successful in reducing the number of DUI drivers, it will reduce the number of accidents they cause and, thus, reduce the number of DUI fatalities. Whether the per se BAC law does reduce the number of automobile fatalities—and, thus, is a useful law—is the empirical issue this paper proposes to investigate.
Any model of automobile fatalities is a function of the unit of observation. Since we are interested in the impact of state laws on automobile fatalities, it seems reasonable that we construct a model to explain the differences in automobile fatalities at the state level (although it is tempting to use county level data). There are interstate differences that potentially explain differences in fatalities. First, people drive more in phyically larger states and states with larger populations than they do in other states. since more driving increases the probability of an accident, we need to standardize our measure of fatalities by the vehicle miles driven in the state. It is traditional in the empirical literature to measure the number of fatalities as fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles driven rather than the number of fatalities; in the interest of simplicity we follow this tradition.
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